CVE-2026-11368
HIGH 7.1The Bluetooth host ATT layer (subsys/bluetooth/host/att.c) associates each in-flight ATT TX buffer with its owning channel via the static tx_meta_data_storage[] array (data->att_chan = chan). When a buffer's last reference is dropped, its net-buf destroy callback defers the completion handling to the system workqueue (att_tx_destroy -> att_tx_destroy_work_handler -> att_on_sent_cb -> bt_att_sent), where bt_att_sent dereferences the channel and its ATT context (sys_slist_get(&att->reqs)). When a peer disconnects while an ATT PDU (a server notification/indication or any response) is still in flight in the controller TX path, L2CAP tears the channel down in l2cap_chan_del(): it runs the disconnected callback and then the released callback (bt_att_released), which frees the channel slab slot. Because the in-flight buffer is held by the connection TX path rather than the channel's own queue, its deferred destroy work can run after the channel has been freed. The att_on_sent_cb guard intended to drop the stale callback itself dereferences meta->att_chan, which is now a dangling pointer into a freed (and possibly reused) slab slot. A remote peer with an ATT connection can drive this by disconnecting during routine ATT traffic; no pairing or user interaction is required to reach the ATT bearer. The result is a use-after-free read/write of freed channel memory, reliably crashing the Bluetooth host (denial of service) and, because the channel slab slot may be reused, potentially corrupting live memory. The fix makes bt_att_released() NULL the att_chan field of every tx_meta_data_storage[] entry still referencing the channel before freeing it, so the deferred guard observes a NULL pointer and drops the callback. Teardown and the destroy work both run on the cooperative system workqueue, so the array update is serialized and needs no lock.
Severe if exploited (CVSS 7.1), but no known exploitation and low modeled probability. Patch on a normal cadence.
Exploitation likelihood
0.2%chance of exploitation in 30 days · 8th percentile
Impact if exploited
7.1CVSS 3.1 · HIGH
- ConfidentialityNone
- IntegrityLow
- AvailabilityHigh
What an attacker needs
- ⚠Access: Must sit on the same / adjacent network
- ✓Privileges: No account or privileges required
- ✓User interaction: No user interaction needed
- ✓Complexity: No special conditions — reliably repeatable
✓ lowers the bar for an attacker · ⚠ raises it
Proof of concept & exploit code
- reference https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-85vg-gwc4-77g7
- github-search Search GitHub for public PoC repos
Test against your own equipment
curl -s https://vulnpedia.com/cve/CVE-2026-11368/poc.jsonMachine-readable PoC index for this CVE (for automation).Listed for defensive triage, patch verification, and authorized testing on systems you own. Machine-readable: /cve/CVE-2026-11368/poc.json
Weakness (CWE)
- CWE-416: use-after-free
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H
Known Affected Software Configurations
| Vendor | Product | Version range |
|---|---|---|
| Zephyrproject | Zephyr | ≥ 4.4.0 and < 4.5.0 |
All CVSS metrics
- HIGH 7.1 v3.1 · CNA Primary
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H - HIGH 7.1 v3.1 · NVD Secondary
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H - MEDIUM 6.5 v3.1 · NVD Primary
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H